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Abstract 
The mechanisms by which moodstates influence attitudejudgments in persuasion settings 
are delineated in terms of current dual-process theorizing. with an emphasis on mecha- 
nisms that may operate when the evaluative implications of message content are ambi- 
guous. In a preliminary test of hypotheses concerning such circumstances, college-aged 
subjects were put into a happy or sad mood and then read a message containing unambi- 
guous strong, unambiguous weak, or ambiguous arguments, which was attributed to 
a highly credible source (heurwtic cue) When message content was ambiguous, sad 
(as compared to happy) subjects’attitudes were more influenced by heuristic processing, 
and their message-related thoughts were biased by the heuristic cue. These and other 
results are discussed within a dual-processing framework, and compared to other social 
cognition theorizing on the impact of afsect on socialjudgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
A considerable amount of recent research has drawn upon the heuristic-systematic 
model (HSM; Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Chaiken, Liberman and Eagly, 1989) and the 
elaboration likelihood model (ELM; Petty and Cacioppo, 1981, 1986) to investigate 
the impact of people’s mood states on processing and attitude judgment (e.g. Bless, 
Bohner, Schwarz and Strack, 1990; Bless, Mackie and Schwarz, 1992; Bohner, Crow, 
Erb and Schwarz, 1992; Innes and Ahrens, 1991, Mackie and Worth, 1989; Worth 
and Mackie, 1987; for reviews, see Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; and Schwarz, Bless 
and Bohner, 1991). This paper extends previous work by contrasting divergent predic- 
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tions, and by delineating the circumstances under which various mediators of mood 
effects on judgment may be most likely to operate. 
Processing persuasive communications 
The HSM and ELM distinguish two strategies of information processing in persua- 
sion settings. Systematic processing, or central route persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo, 
1981), entails thinking carefully about persuasive arguments and other issue-related 
information. When such processing occurs, people typically are more persuaded 
by messages that contain strong rather than weak arguments. When systematic pro- 
cessing is minimal, persuasion may still occur because people utilize simple heuristics 
based on salient non-content cues such as communicator expertise or other people’s 
opinions. When such heuristic processing, or peripheral route persuasion (Petty and 
Cacioppo, 1981), predominates, argument quality typically exerts little persuasive 
impact (see Eagly and Chaiken, 1993)’. 
Because systematic (central) processing is presumed to be more effortful and capa- 
city-constrained than heuristic (peripheral) processing, it requires both motivation 
and ability When either factor is low, heuristic processing is the domnant mechanism 
by which people form attitude judgments. These assumptions (and several others) 
are common to the ELM and HSM, whereas others are unique to one or the other 
model (see Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). 
A particularly important difference between these models concerns the relation 
between processing modes. The ELM’S two routes are conceived as generally antago- 
nistic: factors that increase the likelihood of central route persuasion decrease the 
likelihood of peripheral route persuasion, and vice versa (e.g. Petty and Cacioppo, 
1986, pp. 141-165). In contrast, the HSM assumes that heunstic and systematic 
processing can co-occur. As a consequence, they are assumed capable of exerting 
either additive or interactive effects on judgments, depending on a number of mutable 
factors (see Chaiken et al., 1989). 
Of particular interest here is the interactive hypothesis that heuristic processing 
may bras systematic processing. Specifically, the HSM proposes that people’s heuristic 
processing of cues such as source expertise or consensus information establish expec- 
tancies about the probable validity of a message (or the probable quality of an 
attitude object). These expectancies, in turn, are assumed capable of exerting a selec- 
tive influence on people’s perception and evaluation of persuasive argumentation. 
Importantly, this biasing effect of heunstic processing is assumed to occur mainly 
when motivation for systematic processing is high and when persuasive argumen- 
tation is amenable to distorted interpretation, that is, when arguments are ambiguous 
(Chaiken et al., 1989; Chaiken and Maheswaran, in press). 
’ Differences between these models’ definitions of peripheral versus heuristic processing should be noted. 
Within the ELM, any attitude change that is the effect of some noncontent cue and is independent 
of argument quality IS subsumed under the ‘peripheral route’ This definition encompasses a diversity 
of processes (see Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). The HSM’s definition of heuristic processing is more specific. 
It requires that ‘non-content’ cues (e.g. number of arguments) activate associated cognitive heuristics 
(e.g. ‘length implies strength’), and that attitude judgments are based on the evaluative implications 
of these heunstics (see Chaiken er al., 1989). 
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The impact of affective states 
Dual-process theorizing suggests several ways in which mood may influence persua- 
sion (see Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Petty, Cacioppo and Kasmer, 1988; Schwarz 
et al., 1991). Yet the majority of existing findings point to one main mechanism: 
amount ofsystematic processing. Specifically, positive affect during message exposure 
decreases systematic processing, as compared to negative or neutral affect. Hence, 
elated subjects are typically less persuaded by strong arguments, but more persuaded 
by weak arguments, than subjects who are in either mildly negative or neutral moods 
(e.g. Bless et al., 1990, 1992; Bohner et al., 1992; Innes and Ahrens, 1991, Worth 
and Mackie, 1987). 
Although mood-related decrements in capacity for systematic processing have been 
suggested to explain these findings (e.g. Mackie and Worth, 1989), the more likely 
explanation in our view is mood-induced differences in motivation for processing 
(see Bohner et al., 1992; Schwarz et al., 1991). According to this account, sad mood 
signals potential threat and thus leads to detail-oriented, analytic processing aimed 
at regaining control or dealing with a potentially problematic situation. By contrast, 
happy mood informs the person that the current situation IS unproblematic, thus 
obviating the need for effortful cognitive processing and fostering simple, heuristic 
strategies (Fiedler, 1988; Frijda, 1988; Isen, 1987; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz et al., 
1991). 
Alternative mechanisms underlying the mood-persuasion relation 
It is noteworthy that recent mood studies have not typically observed mood main 
effecrs on persuasion. This fact has cast doubt on two additional mediational possibili- 
ties, that mood may influence persuasion relatively directly, through some heuristic 
or peripheral mechanism, and that mood may influence persuasion indirectly, through 
mood-congruent systematic processing (see Schwarz et al., 1991). Recently, however, 
Petty, Schumann, Richman and Strathman (1993) reported findings consistent with 
both possibilities. When motivation for processing was relatively low, mood appeared 
to exert a direct effect on Judgment, with positive mood leading to more persuasion 
than neutral mood. When motivation for processing was higher, however, subjects’ 
mood influenced attitudes indirectly via the favourability of the thoughts they gener- 
ated in response to the message. According to these researchers’ ELM-based mulf iple- 
role analysis of affect (Petty et al., 1988), under conditions of low motivation (or 
ability) for processing, recipients may (mis)interpret their mood as a reaction to 
the message, and use it as a basis for judgment according to a ‘how do I feel about 
it?’ heuristic (Schwarz, 1990). Yet under conditions of high motivation, positive 
mood is assumed to facilitate the recall of positive material in memory (e.g. Bower, 
198 l), and thus facilitate positive elaborations of message content. In other words, 
high ‘elaboration’ conditions are held to foster mood-congruent systematic processing 
or, in ELM terminology, biased central route persuasion. 
Note that the latter, mood-congruent processing prediction can also be explained 
in terms of the HSM’s bias hypothesis: if mood can function as an heunstic cue, 
as Schwarz et al. (1991) proposed, it has the potential to bias systematic processing 
- if message content is relatively ambiguous. In this regard, it is possible that the 
moderately strong and weak messages used by Petty et al. (1993) were more ambiguous 
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than those used in previous studies (although Petty et al. did not explicitly construct 
their messages to be ambiguous). 
According to the HSM conception of systematic processing, people in sad moods 
should ‘access and scrutinize all [italics added] informational input for its relevance 
and importance to their judgment task, and integrate all useful information [italics 
added] in forming theirjudgments’ (Chaiken et al., 1989, p. 212). If message content 
is sufficiently detailed and has clear-cut evaluative implications, sad persons’ attitudes 
should be primarily mediated by message- (and issue-) related thinking, and the 
impact of heuristic cues should be hard to detect, due to attenuation (Chaiken et 
al., 1989). 
If, however, argumentation is ambiguous or, perhaps, insufficient, sad persons’ 
systematic processing may be biased by heuristic processing. Under these arcurn- 
stances, sad subjects’ attitudes would be mediated by message-related thinking. Yet 
the valence of this thought would be biased by these sad recipients’ prior processing 
of heuristic cues such as source credibility or consensus information. 
Happy persons generally lack motivation for systematic processing. Their attitudes 
should primarily be determined by heuristic processing, independent of the amount, 
strength, or ambiguity of persuasive arguments. Indeed, In the absence of ajudgment- 
oriented processing goal, they may even be less influenced by heuristic cues than 
sad recipients (see Chaiken er al.’s (1989) enhancement hypothesis). 
Initial evidence for the co-occurrence,of systematic and heuristic processing under 
sad mood was obtained by Bohner et al. (1992). In this study, happy and sad Subjects 
were confronted with a request to donate money to a charity This request was 
insufficiently justified (i.e. only one strong or one weak argument was grven), but 
was presented in combination with a salient strong or weak consensus cue (a list 
of contributors containing many versus few names). Happy subjects’ responses to 
the request were uninfluenced by either the heunstic cue or the content of the message, 
whereas sad subjects’ responses were influenced by both factors. Additional analyses 
(see Bohner, 1990) yielded findings consistent with the HSM’s bias hypothesis: when 
the donation request was accompanied by a strong consensus cue, sad (but not 
happy) subjects tended to evaluate its content more positively than when it was 
paired with a weak cue. 
Mood and message ambiguity 
To further explore the interplay of heunstic and systematic processing under sad 
mood, we had happy or sad subjects read a message touting the attributes of a 
new telephone answering machine, the XT-100. This message contained extensive 
persuasive argumentation, but its ambiguity and strength was vaned. In all con- 
ditions, apositzve heuristic cue was provided. 
We expected sad subjects to process more systematically than happy Subjects, 
an effect that normally would produce an interaction between mood and argument 
quality. However, because a positive heuristic cue was available to all Subjects (unlike 
most previous work), our predictions had to take this factor into account. We there- 
fore expected sad (versus happy) subjects to report less favourable attitudes when 
exposed to weak arguments, because in this condition, sad subjects’ systematic process- 
ing and happy subjects’ heuristic processing should yield relatively negative and 
reIativeIy positive evaluations of the XT- 100, respectively. No mood difference in 
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persuasion was expected for the strong argument condition, however; in this condition 
sad subjects’ systematic processing and happy subjects’ heuristic processing should 
both yield relatively favourable evaluations of the XT-100. 
Two predictions were entertained for the ambiguous message conditions. Accord- 
ing to the HSM’s bias hypothesis, no mood difference in persuasion should obtain 
because sad subjects’ systematic processing should be positively biased by the heuristic 
cue, leading them to form attitudes no less favourable than those formed by happy 
subjects (via heuristic processing alone). However, to the extent that (1) mood itself 
is used as an heuristic cue or (2) mood-congruent processing mediates attitudes, 
happy Subjects would be expected to form more positive evaluations of the XT-100 
than sad mood subjects. 
Our predictions regarding the impact of mood on attitude judgment per se were 
tested by analysis of variance (ANOVA) and appropriate contrasts, and our more 
specific hypotheses regarding the mediation of persuasion were tested by regression 
analyses. 
METHOD 
Subjects and design 
One hundred and forty-nine introductory psychology students at  New York Univer- 
sity participated in partial fulfilment of a course requirement. They were randomly 
assigned to conditions in the study’s 3 (message content: ambiguous strong, ambi- 
guous, unambiguous weak) x2 (mood: happy, sad) design. Data from 35 subjects 
were eliminated from the analyses, because they failed to follow instructions in the 
mood induction task ( N  = 7) or suspected a relationship between this task and 
the persuasive message (N = 28); discarded subjects were evenly distributed across 
conditions, x 2  (5; N = 149) = 4 . 3 9 , ~  > 0.48. 
Procedure 
Subjects participated in small group sessions in a room fitted with privacy panels. 
They were told that two different studies were being conducted, one on ‘autobiogra- 
phical memory’ and one on ‘product evaluation’ The first of these allegedly unrelated 
studies manipulated and measured mood and the second presented and assessed 
the impact of the persuasive message. After completing an open-ended suspicion 
probe, subjects were debriefed. 
Independent variables 
Mood 
Subjects were asked to recall and describe either a happy or a sadlife event, ostensibly 
to aid in the construction of an ‘Autobiographical Memory Inventory’ They were 
given 10 minutes to write down the event, and were encouraged to ‘re-he’ the emo- 
tions the event had elicited (cf Bless ei al., 1990). 
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Message content 
In the ‘product evaluation study’, subjects learned that the manufacturer of a new 
telephone answering machine, the XT-100, was seeking the opinions of potential 
consumers. Subjects read a ‘test report’ which compared the XT-100 to two competing 
brands on six attributes and asserted that the XT-100 was the best brand. Depending 
on message conditions, the XT-100 was described as superior on four important 
attributes and inferior on two unimportant ones (unambiguous strong), superior on 
four unimportant attributes and inferior on two important ones (unambiguous weak), 
or as superiorhnferior on equal numbers of importanthinimportant attributes (ambi- 
guous: see Table 1)*. 
Table 1. Attributes and valence of attribute-companson (+ versus -) used to construct the 
unambiguous strong (S), unambiguous weak 0, and two ambiguous messages (Ai, A2) 
Message type 
S W A, A, 
Important attributes - - - Cassette flexibility + 
Message retrieval + + 
Personal memo facility + + 
Call screening + 
Variety of colours - - - 
Number of phone lines - + + + 
Variety of sizes + + 
Bolts for wall mounting + 
+ - - 
Unimportant attributes + 
- 
Entnts indicate that an attribute was included in the message, and whether the target product was portrayed 
as supenor (+) or inferior (-) to its compehtors on that attribute. 
Positive source cue 
Prior to reading the test report, all subjects learned that it had been excerpted from 
Consumer Reports, a magazine specializing in the scientific testing of consumer prod- 
ucts. Prior research (Chaiken and Maheswaran, in press) indicated that subjects 
would regard this source as expert and trustworthy. 
Manipulation checks 
After the mood induction subjects rated how they felt ‘right now at this moment’ 
on a scale anchored by ‘bad’ (1) and ‘good’ (1 1). This question was embedded in 
a questionnaire that subjects believed was part of the autobiographical memory 
study. 
After message exposure and the assessment of the dependent variables (see below), 
* These materials were adapted from Chaiken and Maheswaran (in press). For methodologcal reasons 
two renditions of the ambiguous message were used, with subjects randomly as~~gned to one or the 
other. AS in the Chaiken and Maheswaran study. preliminary analyses confirmed that the two renditions 
produced virtually identical findings. The reported analyses therefore feature only the theoretically impon- 
ant levels of the message content factor (strong versus ambiguous versus weak). 
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subjects rated the extent to which the test report had portrayed the XT-I00 as having 
few (versus many) positive features, many (versus few) negative features, fewer (versus 
more) positive features than other brands, more (versus fewer) negative features 
than other brands, and as inferior (versus superior) to other brands; responses to 
these (-4 to +4) scales were averaged to form one message perception index (Cron- 
bach’s u = 0.85). 
Source evaluation ratings were collected to verify that the message source was 
perceived positively and also for use in the regression analyses. Subjects rated the 
credibility, reliability, trustworthiness, and expertise of Consumer Reports on bipolar 
( - 4  to +4) scales, and these responses were averaged to form one source evaluation 
index (a = 0.95). 
Dependent variables 
Attitudes 
Subjects rated the extent to which they would consider buying the XT-100, their 
favourability toward the XT-100, and the extent to which they regarded the product 
as useful and as good. Responses to these (-4 to +4) scales were averaged to form 
one attitude index (a = 0.89). 
Cognitive responses 
Subjects were given 3 minutes to list any thoughts they might have had while reading 
the test report. Two independent raters later categorized subjects’ thoughts as attn- 
bute-related or source-related (A, S ) ,  and as favourable, unfavourable, or neutral 
toward the XT-100 (+, -, n). Interrater agreement was 94 per cent and 84 per 
cent for the content and valence codings, respectively; disagreements were resolved 
by discussion. 
Two indexes were created from data: valenced attribute-related thoughts ( VAT) 
and valenced source-related thoughts f VSQ. Each was formed by subtracting the 
proportion of negative from the proportion of positive thoughts in the relevant 
category VAT indexed the valence of systematic processing, whereas VST (and the 
source evaluation index) indexed the valence of heuristic processing. 
RESULTS 
The hypotheses were tested by three-way mood xmessage content xgender ANOVAs 
and regression analyses. 
Manipulation checks 
The check on the mood induction yielded means of 8.21 and 4.15 for the happy 
and sad conditions, respectively, F(l,1013) =56.10, p < 0.00014 Perceived message 
’ One subject did not respond to the mood question. 
‘ A  mood x gender interaction, p < 0.03, indicated that this effect was stronger for female subjects 
(Mhappy = 8.96, Mrad = 4.36) than for male subjects, Mh,ppy = 7.61, M,, = 5.14). However, simple 
effects tests confirmed that the induction was reliable for males (p < 0.001) as well as females (D < 0.001). 
214 G. Bohner, S. Chaiken ad P Hunyadi 
content means for the strong, ambiguous, and weak messages were +2.73, +1.78, 
and + 1.47, respectively, F(2,102) = 7.72, p < 0.002. Finally, the grand-mean for 
the source evafuatzon index was +1.38, which differed significantly from the scale 
midpoint (0), F(1,lOO) = 57 77, p < 0.001. Thus the mood and message manipula- 
tions were successful and Consumer Reports was regarded as a credible source. 
Attitudes 
The ANOVA on postmessage attitudes yielded a main effect for argument strength, 
F(2,102) = 19.71, p < 0.001, with means of +2.20, +1.31, +0.03, for the unambi- 
guous strong, ambiguous, and unambiguous weak messages, respectively Although 
the mood x message interaction was not reliable, the means patterned in accord 
with our specific predictions. Recall that we expected a happy-sad difference to 
emerge only in the unambiguous weak message condition, where sad subjects’ syste- 
matic processing of message content and happy subjects’ heuristic processing of 
the source cue would produce divergent evaluations of the XT-100. Planned compari- 
sons confirmed that given weak arguments, sad (versus happy) subjects indeed 
reported more negative attitudes (Ms = -0.34 versus +0.42), I (  102) = 1.69, p < 0.05, 
one-tailed. This happy-sad contrast was nonsignificant within the ambiguous (Mhappy 
= +1.33; Mad = +1.29) and strong argument conditions (Mhappy = +2.28; h i r a d  
= +2.13), each t < 1’ 
Cognitive responses 
Overall, the valence of subjects’ attribute-related thoughts was slightly negative 
(grand-mean = 0.12). These VAT scores became more negative as message type 
changed from unambiguous strong to ambiguous to unambiguous weak ( M s  = 0.01 
versus -0.15 versus -0.22), F(2,102) = 7.98, p < 0.002. The only other effect to 
attain even marginal significance was a mood main effect, F(1,102) =2.95, p < 0.09 
Contrary to what might be expected if mood congruent systematic processing 
occurred, VAT scores were more negative among happy (versus sad) Subjects 
(Ms = -0.17 versus -0.07). 
Valenced source-related thinking was also slightly negative on an overall basis 
(grand-mean = -0.02). The ANOVA on these VST scores yielded only one reliable 
effect. Women’s source-related thinking was more positive than men’s, F( 1,102) = 
6.05, p < 0.02. 
Regression analyses 
Hierarchical regression analyses tested our hypotheses regarding the mediation of 
persuasion. In the first set of analyses, the relative contributions of heunstic and 
systematic processing in the various experimental conditions were analysed. This 
was accomplished by regressing subjects’ attitudes on the experimental mood and 
message manipulations, valenced attribute-related thinking, valenced source-related 
’ In addition, a marginal main effect of gender, p < 0.08, and a margnal interaction of argument strength 
and gender emerged, p c 0.10. These indicated that women (versus men) tended to report more posltive 
attitudes. and were also slightly less influenced by the message manipulation. Neither of these trends. 
however, interacted with mood (all ps > 0.25). 
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thinking, and on cross-product terms which represent the theoretically meaningful 
interactions among these predictors (see Table 2). 
In a second set of regressions, the HSM’s bias hypothesis was tested: valenced 
attribute-related thoughts were regressed on the mood and message manipulations, 
source evaluations, and the interactions of these variables (see Table 3) .  
Finally, to explore mood-congruency effects, attitudes were regressed on the mood 
manipulation-check scores, along with the experimental independent variables and 
Interaction terms. Results of these three analyses are described in turn. 
Predicting attitudes from valenced thought measures 
With the attitude index as the dependent variable, we used the following predictor 
variables: message strength (+ 1 = strong; 0 = ambiguous; - 1 = weak), message 
ambiguity (-1 = unambiguous; + 2  = ambiguous)6, induced mood (0 = sad; 
1 = happy), valenced source-related thoughts (VST, range - 1 to + l), and valenced 
attribute-related thoughts (VAT, range - 1 to + 1). Both main effects and interaction 
terms were entered in the equation, as specified in panel (a) of Table 2. In addition, 
separate regressions were performed for each mood condition to further diagnose 
potential interactions, as specified in panels (b) and (c) ofTable 2. 
These analyses generally confirmed predictions. Overall, VAT was positively 
related to attitude judgments, semipartial r = 0.26, p < 0.001, indicating that sys- 
tematic processing mediated attitude judgment. In line with previous research (Bless 
et a/., 1990; Bohner et af., 1992), this relationship was somewhat stronger under 
sad (r = 0.35’) than under happy mood ( r  = 0.21), although the VAT x mood 
interaction was unreliable, r = -0.08. 
In addition, the significant negative coefficient for the VST X mood x ambiguity 
interaction ( r  = -0.20, p < 0.01) indicates that the contribution of source-related 
thinking covaried with specific combinations of mood and ambiguity Together with 
the significant simple interaction of VST by ambiguity under sad mood (r = 0.22, 
p < 0.05), this supports the hypothesis that the contribution of heuristic processing 
in predicting judgment increased when sad subjects received an ambiguous message. 
Happy subjects, by contrast, relied on the heuristic cue independent of message 
ambiguity, as indicated by the significant simple main effect of VST ( r  = 0.3 1 , p  < 0.01, 
sad mood: r = - 0.01, n.s.) and the unreliable simple VST x ambiguity interaction 
( r  = - 0 . 1 5 , p  0.15). 
These results indicate that, although sad and happy subjects’ attitude judgments 
were mediated by systematic processing, sad subjects’ attitudes depended somewhat 
more on this processing strategy Further, happy subjects’ attitudes were generafly 
influenced by source-related thoughts, whereas sad subjects’ attitudes depended on 
source-related thoughts only when they received an ambiguous message. In this con- 
dition, then, heuristic and systematic processing co-occurred for sad subjects. 
Note that the contributions of message strength and ambiguity can be thought of statistically as orthogo- 
nal contrasts. 
’ This and all following r-statistics in this section denote sernrpartial correlation coeficrents. 
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Table 2. Regression analysis predicting attitudes from valenced thought measures 
SteD Effect* Beta SemiDartial r 
(a) Full design 
1 Strength (1 = strong, 0 = ambiguous,- 1 = weak) 
Ambiguity (- 1 = unamb., +2 = amb.) 
Mood (0 = sad, 1 = happy) 
Valenced Attribute-Related Thoughts (VAT) 
Valenced Source-Related Thoughts (VST) 
Mood x ambiguity 
VAT X VST 
3 VST x mood 
VST x strength 
VST x ambiguity 
VAT x mood 
VAT x strength 
VAT x ambiguity 
VST x mood x strength 
VAT x mood x strength 
VST x mood x ambiguity 
VAT xmood xambiguity 
2 Mood x strength 
4 
(b) Happy mood conditions 
I Strength (1 = strong, 0 = ambiguous, - 1 = weak) 
Ambiguity (- 1 = unamb.,+2 = amb.) 
VAT 
VST 
2 VAT x VST 
3 VST x strength 
VAT x strength 
VST X ambiguity 
VAT X ambiguity 
(c) Sad mood conditions 
1 Strength (1 = strong, 0 = ambiguous, - 1 = weak) 
Ambiguity (- 1 = unamb.,+2 = amb.) 
VAT 
VST 
2 VAT X VST 
3 VST x strength 
VAT x strength 
VST x ambiguity 
VAT x ambiguity 
0.40 
0.06 
0.12 
0.28 
0.13 
-0.14 
- 0.09 
-0.22 
0.12 
- 0.06 
0.03 
-0.16 
-0.10 
0.05 
-0.07 
0.24 
-0.49 
-0.16 
0.39 
0.03 
0.23 
0.3 1 
-0.1 1 
-0.20 
-0.07 
-0.17 
-0.08 
0.44 
0.13 
0.36 
-0.00 
-0.21 
- 0.02 
-0.19 
0.42 
0.16 
0.373 
0.06 
0.12 
0.26$ 
0.12 
-0.10 
-0.06 
-0.208 
0.08 
- 0.06 
0.02 
-0.08 
-0.08 
0.03 
-0.05 
0.07 
-0.20s 
-0.07 
0.359 
0.03 
0.21 
0.318 
-0.08 
-0.18 
-0.05 
-0.15 
-0.06 
0.42$ 
0.12 
0.358 
-0.01 
-0.20 
-0.02 
-0.1 1 
0.228 
0.09 
~~~ ~~ 
*Each effect is adjusted for all effects entered in the same or preceding steps. 
t p  < 0.01; $p c 0.05; $p < 0.001. 
Predicting attribute-related thoughts from source evaluations 
In the second set of regressions, shown in Table 3, we tested whether subjects’ percep- 
tions of the source biased thelr systematic processing. VAT scores were the criterion 
variable, and manipulated mood, message strength and ambiguity, source evaluation, 
and their interactions served as predictors. 
According to  the HSM’s bias hypothesis, valenced attribute-related thinking 
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Table 3. Regresslon analysis predicting valenced attribute-related thoughts from source evalu- 
ations 
Step Effect* Beta Semipartial r 
(a) Full design 
1 Strength (1 = strong, 0 = ambiguous, - 1 = weak) 
Ambiguity (- 1 = unamb.. +2 = amb.) 
Mood (0 = sad. 1 = happy) 
Source evaluation (SE) 
Mood x ambiguity 
SE X strength 
SE x ambiguity 
SE x mood x strength 
SE x mood X ambiguity 
2 Mood x strength 
3 SE x mood 
4 
(b) Happy mood conditions 
1 Strength (1 = strong, 0 = ambiguous, - 1 = weak) 
Ambiguity (- 1 = unamb., +2 = amb.) 
SE 
SE x ambiguity 
2 SE x strength 
(c) Sad mood conditions 
1 Strength (1 = strong, 0 = ambiguous, - 1 = weak) 
Ambiguity (- 1 = unamb., +2 = amb.) 
SE 
SE x ambiguity 
2 SE x strength 
0.29 
-0.09 
-0.18 
0.20 
-0.23 
0.02 
-0.49 
-0.31 
0.23 
-0.27 
-1.31 
0.45 
-0.07 
0.03 
-0.04 
-0.86 
0.13 
-0.12 
0.38 
-0.49 
0.96 
0.29t 
-0.09 
-0.18$ 
0.20$ 
-0.16 
0.01 
-0.13 
-0.08 
0.06 
-0.05 
-0.23t 
0.446 
-0.07 
0.03 
-0.01 
-0.19 
0.13 
-0.12 
0.37t 
-0.13 
0.30$ - .  
*Each effect is adjusted for all effects entcrcd in the same or preceding steps. 
tp  < 0.01; *p < 0.05; op c 0.001. 
should be biased by source evaluation for sad subjects who encounter ambiguous 
arguments, but not for happy subjects, and not for unambiguous arguments, regard- 
less of recipient mood. This pattern was indeed obtained, as reflected in an interaction 
of mood, message ambiguity, and source evaluation (r = -0.23, p < 0.01; see panel 
(a) of Table 3). Additional analyses within the sad mood condition revealed that 
sad subjects’ attribute-related thoughts covaried with source evaluation ( r  = 0.37, 
p < 0.005; see panel (c) of Table 3), and that this correlation was stronger when 
the message was ambiguous than when it was unambiguous (interaction of source 
evaluation and ambiguity, r = 0.30, p < 0.02). Thus, we found evidence for a biasing 
effect of source perceptions on sad mood subjects’ systematic processing of ambiguous 
messages. No effects of source evaluation on VAT were observed under happy mood 
(p > 0.12 for all coefficients involving this predictor; see panel (b) of Table 3). 
Predicting attitudes from reported mood: a lest of rhe mood-as-cue hyporhesis 
To test whether mood influenced attitudes either directly or indirectly via mood- 
congruent thinking, two additional sets of regressions were performed, using attitudes 
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and VAT scores, respectively, as the criterion. Predictors were message strength, 
ambiguity, reported mood, and their interactions. 
For the full sample, these analyses yielded no significant results’ Additional 
analyses conducted separately for the two mood conditions also produced null effects. 
Thus, the present data give no indication that subjects either used their mood as 
an heuristic cue or engaged in mood-congruent systematic processing. 
DISCUSSION 
Although the ANOVA yielded only weak evidence for mood effects on attitudes, 
the pattern of means and specific contrasts were nonetheless supportive of our predic- 
tion - and much past research - that people in sad moods are more influenced 
by variations in message content than are people in happy moods. We suspect that 
the failure to detect a reliable mood by argument quality effect in the overall ANOVA 
was due to the presence of a highly salient positive source cue in all experimental 
conditions. Indeed our specific predictions took this fact into account. 
Despite the weak ANOVA results, the regression analyses substantiated mood- 
dependent differences in processing strategies and the predictions of the HSM. Sub- 
jects in a sad mood, who processed systematically, also used heunstic cue information 
when message content was ambiguous. That both heuristic and systematic processing 
affected judgment in the sad-ambiguous condition provides further evidence that 
these modes need not be regarded as mutually exclusive, antagonistic processing 
strategies. In combination with earlier findings (Bohner et al., 1992), the results 
suggest that the two strategies may co-occur when a recipient’s negative affective 
state induces high motivation for processing and message content is ambiguous or 
insufficient. 
Our study also provided support for the HSM’s bias hypothesis. In a recent study 
by Chaiken and Maheswaran (in press), subjects’ systematic processing of ambiguous 
message content was biased by evaluations of a source cue when task importance 
was high. Our data indicate that negative mood at the time of message processing 
may similarly enhance recipients’ motivation to process and lead to analogous biasing 
effects of heuristic cues on systematic processing. To explore this possibility further, 
subsequent studies should feature explicit manipulations of heuristic cues such as 
source credibility or consensus information. 
The study provided little evidence for the use of mood itself as an heuristic cue 
or for mood-congruent systematic processing, even when message content was ambi- 
guous. It should be acknowledged, however, that the direct, heunstic effects of mood 
may be restricted to circumstances in which motivation (or ability) for argument 
processing is low (Petty et al., 1993) andother heuristic cues are unavailable (Schwarz, 
1990). Neither condition was met in the present expenment: the judgmental task 
was moderately involving (as evidenced by the high overall impact of message con- 
tent), processing time was essentially unrestricted, and a salient ‘competing’ heunstic 
cue was present in all experimental conditions. It is less clear why mood-congruent 
systematic processing was not observed, given Petty et al.’s (1993) recent findings 
and our expectation that such processing would be especially likely with ambiguous 
Attitudes were independent of measured mood, r = -0.02; valenced attribute related thoughts showed 
a nonsignificant negative relation with mood, r = -0.14. 
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message content. In line with ELM assumptions, perhaps the ‘elaboration likelihood’ 
was higher in the Petty et al. research than in our study Alternatively, and more 
speculatively, perhaps mood-congruent systematic processing is also restricted to 
circumstances in which salient heuristic cues are unavailable to recipients. 
Mood-persuasion research and other models of affect and cognition 
The results of recent research have dramatically changed our understanding of how 
mood influences persuasion, from the rather simplistic notion that happy people 
are easier to persuade (see McGuire, 1985) to a more complex, dual-process-oriented 
view (see Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Schwarz et al., 1991). This research indicates 
that affective states influence people’s information processing strategies and, hence, 
interact with factors such as argument quality and communicator variables to affect 
judgment . 
How do these persuasion findings fit with other theorizing and research on the 
affect-cognition interface? In particular, why is it that evidence for mood-congruent 
judgment, a well-documented phenomenon in other judgment domains (e.g. Mayer, 
Gaschke, Braverman and Evans, 1992), has only rarely been observed by persuasion 
researchers (Petty et al., 1993)? 
In other domains two major mechanisms have been proposed to account for mood- 
congruent judgment. According to the priming explanation, mood states automati- 
cally facilitate the retrieval of mood-congruent material from memory, which is then 
used as a basis ofjudgment (e.g. Bower, 1981, Isen, 1987). According to themood-as- 
information view, mood congruent judgment reflects people’s tendency to use their 
mood states as informational cues, according to a ‘How do I feel about it?’ heuristic 
(Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz and Clore, 1988). 
The priming mechanism may be most likely to operate with self-referential and 
relatively unstructured material (see Blaney, 1986). In contrast, the messages that 
characterize persuasion research are usually well-structured and not typically self- 
referential. 
The mood-as-information mechanism can explain a range of mood-congruentjudg- 
ment effects (see Schwarz, 1990). However, it is most likely to operate when (a) 
people have little reason to doubt the informational value of their feelings, and 
(b) affect is salient at the time the judgment is made. The ranty of mood main 
effects in persuasion studies might, then, be explicable to the extent that their mood 
inductions have been fairly obvious to subjects. Although possible, we suspect that 
the main reason for their rarity is that mood is typically induced prior to message 
exposure (but see Bless et al., 1992). Thus, it may exert its strongest impact on 
message encoding and elaboration, rather than at  the subsequent judgment state’ 
As we have also noted, the heuristic nature of the mood-as-information effect implies 
that it should be most evident in low motivation settings. 
To conclude, we note that the mood effects on processing strategy that persuasion 
researchers have documented appear to be a robust phenomenon. This is not to 
It is noteworthy that in one of the studies that obtained evidence for a direct effect of  mood on attitude 
(Petty ef ol., 1993, Experiment 2), the persuasive message was embeddedin a television programme designed 
to induce positive (versus neutral) mood. Thus, the portion of the mood-inducing programme that Subjects 
watched u j e r  the persuasive message may have amplified their current mood immediately before they 
were asked to make a judgment, rendering mood-as-information effects more likely. 
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say that main effects of  mood are unobservable in such research. However, the bound- 
ary conditions for the various mechanisms by which mood affects attitudes and  
other social judgments are not yet well understood (see Clore, Schwarz and Conway, 
in press; Forgas, 1992). Clarifying these hypotheses and their boundary conditions 
thus remains an important theoretical and empirical task. 
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